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THE RETURN OF CESENA TO THE DIRECT DOMINION
OF THE CHURCH AFTER THE DEATH
OF MALATESTA NOVELLO

I

The process by which the Papacy — in local terms a « foreign » power, operating through foreign officials and soldiers, and head of a political organism structurally incapable of exciting any feelings akin to « patriotism » — displaced a well-established local *signoria* in its dominions and re-asserted its own direct temporal authority, is a process worthy of close examination, above all in relation to the disposition of political forces within the local community itself. Such an examination may cast considerable light both upon the nature of the problems of government of the Papal State and upon the problem of the nature of the *signoria* and its relationship to the community which it dominated.

An interesting and as yet relatively unexplored instance of such a Papal displacement of a signorial régime is to be found in 1465 in the Romagnol city of Cesena, chief centre of a sliver of territory stretching southwards down the Savio valley into the Etruscan Apennines and north-eastwards to the Adriatic coast, and long subject to the signorial rule of the family of Malatesta. It is true that — with the exception of Giuliano Fantaguzzi's *Caos* — Cesena is virtually destitute of contemporary chronicles relating to the years in which direct Papal rule was re-established. It is also true that the considerable wealth of material stored in Cesena's Archivio Storico Comunale has many frustrating gaps in the sections relating to these years. Nonetheless, what has survived, when supplemented with material from the central Papal archives, does allow

at least the main lines of the picture of what happened in Cesena after 1465 to be drawn. And the picture which emerges, although in many respects less dramatic than has sometimes been anticipated, is an interesting and illuminating one (1).

Domenico Malatesta Novello, last Malatesta *signore* of Cesena, died on 20 November 1465, leaving no direct legitimate or natural male heirs. By the terms of the peace of 1463 which ended the long struggle between the Malatesta brothers of Cesena and Rimini and Pope Pius II, Cesena was in such an event automatically to return under the direct dominion of the Holy See, together with the other parts of Malatesta Novello's vicariate. And an oath to surrender themselves willingly to the Church in such circumstances had been imposed directly on the communities concerned (2). Despite the fact that, for some four months before the ailing *signore* died, the Pope — now Paul II — had been preparing to enforce the observance of this agreement (3), the transition to Papal rule in Cesena after Malatesta Novello's death was not altogether smooth. An attempt was made to prolong the life of the Malatesta *signoria*. Roberto Malatesta, natural son of Malatesta Novello's brother Sigismondo of Rimini, attempted to secure his uncle's succession, having apparently previously been aided in his preparations for such a step by Malatesta Novello himself (4). Immediately upon his uncle's death, Roberto occupied the castle and gates of Cesena, and addressed appeals for aid to Milan, Florence, Venice, and even Rome itself. He wrote to Francesco Sforza in Milan that he found *questi nostri populi bene disposti verso casa mia* (5), and he attempted to widen the bases of his support in Cesena by a proclamation quashing judicial sentences and proceedings and providing for the

(1) In this study, use has been made primarily of material from the Archivio Storico Comunale of Cesena (cited as A.S.C. Cesena), above all from the Sezione Antica, Parte I: Statuti, Capitoli, Privilegi ed Atti del Consiglio Generale; from the Archivio Segreto Vaticano (cited as Arch. Vat.); and from the Biblioteca Civica Gambalunga, Rimini (cfr. note 54 below). Special thanks for assistance are due to the staff of the Archivio Segreto Vaticano, to Dr. Antonio Brasini of the Biblioteca Malatestiana, Cesena, and to Prof. Mario Zuffa of the Biblioteca Gambalunghiana, Rimini.

(2) For the conditions of the peace of 1463, see G. SORANZO, *Pio II e la politica italiana nella lotta contro i Malatesti (1457-1463)*, Padova 1911, pp. 403-5, 444-55.

(3) Cfr. letter of Paul II to Federigo da Montefeltro in July 1465, cited in G. FRANCESCHINI, *Violante Montefeltro Malatesti Signora di Cesena*, in « Studi Romagnoli », I (1950), p. 160.

(4) See G. SORANZO, *Sigismondo Pandolfo Malatesta in Morea e le vicende del suo dominio*, in « Atti e Mem. Dep. Storia Patria Prov. Romagna », s. IV, vol. VIII (1917-18), pp. 270-7.

(5) Letter of 20 November 1465, in FRANCESCHINI, op. cit., p. 160.

return of exiles (6). However, the might of the Papal army speedily moved to Cesena from Roncofreddo and Longiano under the command of Federico da Montefeltro of Urbino, soon put an end to Roberto's adventure. The external aid for which he had appealed failed to materialise, and whatever internal support he may initially have enjoyed seems rapidly to have evaporated. Roberto was obliged to surrender, and on 9 December the city admitted the Papal Commissioner Lorenzo Zane, Archbishop of Spalato and Papal Treasurer-General, who had been sent *cum plena potestate* to receive Cesena under the direct rule of the Church, and to grant any concessions or privileges which the community might reasonably demand (7). The Malatesta *signoria* had ended and the *signoria* of the Church had begun.

To a very considerable degree, undoubtedly, the Papacy's successful supplanting of the Malatesta *signoria* in Cesena in 1465 must be viewed in terms of the interstate politics of the Italian peninsula. The implication of external powers — Florence, Milan and Venice — in the Cesena question in 1465 has already been demonstrated and examined in some detail, above all by Giovanni Soranzo (8). It appears clear that the fact that in the end none of these powers saw fit to intervene with any insistence was a major reason, if not the major reason, for Roberto Malatesta's failure and the Papacy's success (9). As Dr. Philip Jones has pointed out, a suggestive comparison may be made between Roberto's failure at Cesena in 1465 and his subsequent success in 1468-9 at Rimini, where he enjoyed the support of the league of Naples, Florence and Milan (10). Nonetheless, it is also important and illuminating to examine the Papacy's re-establishment of its direct rule in Cesena from the point of view of the internal situation in Cesena itself, and this is what this essay sets out to do. We shall enquire, firstly, into the terms on which direct Papal rule was re-established in Cesena and the effect of the change of régime on the actual struc-

(6) A.S.C. Cesena, vol. 25, c. 81r, Proclamation of 21.XI.1465.

(7) Cfr. SORANZO, *S. P. Malatesta in Morea*, cit., pp. 274-5. Lorenzo Zane's commission dated from 1 December 1465 - cfr. Arch. Vat., Arm. XXIX, Div. Cam., t. 34, c. 114r.

(8) Notably in SORANZO, *S. P. Malatesta in Morea*, cit., pp. 270-7.

(9) It is possible, however, that the implication of these powers played a part in securing the generous Papal concessions made to Roberto Malatesta after his defeat, including the vicariates of Meldola and Sarsina and other less important nearby centres.

(10) P. J. JONES, *The End of Malatesta Rule in Rimini*, in *Italian Renaissance Studies*, ed. E. F. Jacob, London 1960, p. 251.

ture and processes of communal government; secondly, into the impact, if any, of the change of rule on the pattern of distribution of political, social and economic power in the commune; and thirdly, into the degree of stability achieved by the new régime and the real nature of the stresses and strains within it.

II

Cesena's formal reception under the direct dominion of the Church was embodied in a bull of Paul II of 17 January 1466, which promised to retain Cesena under Papal rule *perpetuis temporibus* and gave an explicit guarantee against any further alienation of the city in vicariate (11). The re-establishment of direct Papal rule in Cesena entailed, of course, the imposition on the Commune, in the place of the Malatesta *signoria*, of the normal superstructure of the provincial officialdom of the Papal State (12). Henceforward, firstly, Cesena was to be the seat of a Papally-appointed Governor, usually a bishop, in whom were vested extensive, quasi-signorial powers. The jurisdiction of the Governor of Cesena was to extend over the entire area of the province of Romagna now subject to the direct dominion of the Holy See, as far as the River Foglia (13). The Governor was appointed *in spiritualibus et temporalibus*, and was given the fullest powers of jurisdiction, *iurisdictionem plenam et omnimodam cum mero et mixto imperio*. He had jurisdiction over all civil and criminal cases, both of first instance and of appeal, and could normally terminate cases at the stage of second appeal — although appeal to Rome was possible. He had power to impose and ensure the execution of sentences for any offence, particularly for crimes against the state. He also had powers of pardon. The Governor was empowered to issue decrees, and he could approve or suspend the communal statutes as he saw fit. He had extensive powers over the appointment and removal of officials, and was authorised to receive homage and

(11) A.S.C. Cesena, 12, n. XIII; Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 525, c. 119v-120v.

(12) For the best general account, see P. PARTNER, *The Papal State under Martin V. The Administration and Government of the Temporal Power in the Early Fifteenth Century*, London 1958, pp. 95-130.

(13) The areas of the Romagna which were still subject only to the mediate dominion of the Church — including the territories centred on Imola, Faenza and Forlì — were the responsibility of the Governor or Legate in Bologna: cfr. Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 542, c. 223v-226v; Reg. Vat. 543, c. 122r-125v.

oaths of fidelity to the Papacy. He also had controlling authority over Papal military forces in the area over which he was Governor (14). Finally, these extensive powers were on occasion supplemented by the grant of the powers and privileges of a Legate *de latere*, as in the cases of Lorenzo Zane's appointments in 1475, 1479 and 1483 (15).

Beside the Governor stood another powerful Papal official, the Apostolic Treasurer of the province. The Treasurer, usually a clerk of the Apostolic Camera, was formally subordinate in rank to the Governor, but his authority was virtually independent of the Governor's, being derived directly from the Camera. Moreover, the area of the Treasurer's jurisdiction was somewhat wider than that of the Governor, extending over all the province of Romagna with the exception of Bologna, and extending beyond the River Foglia to Fano (seat of another Governor), Senigallia and the vicariate of Mondavio. The Treasurer controlled all the revenues pertaining to the Apostolic Camera and exercised ultimate supervision over the cameral monopolies. All payments from the provincial revenues of the Camera had to be made by the Treasurer, on request from the Governor or from the Camera in Rome. The Treasurer was also given specific authority to inspect all fortifications in the area, to penalise those responsible for any deficiencies which he found and to ensure that any such deficiencies were remedied. He was also to make an annual inventory of all supplies of munitions (16).

Around the Governor and Treasurer was centred a *curia* of lesser Papal officials, in particular judges and notaries. Police powers were vested in a Papal Marshal or *Bargello*, in command of a force of some twenty men-at-arms (17). Scattered through the province there were also the various Papal castellans, the more important

(14) Examples of bulls of appointment of Governors of Cesena may be found in Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 542, c. 172v-173v, 233r-234v; Reg. Vat. 543, c. 63r-65r; Reg. Vat. 598, c. 2r-6r; Reg. Vat. 656, c. 18r-19v, 201v-204r; Reg. Vat. 658, c. 88r-92r; Reg. Vat. 659, c. 108v-113r. The bull of appointment of Giovanni Venturelli da Amelia (2.XI.1475) is also to be found in A.S.C. Cesena, v. 51, c. 61r, and in S. CHIARAMONTI, *Caesenae Historia ab initio Ciuitatis ad haec tempora...*, Caesenae 1641, pp. 764-7.

(15) Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 678, c. 492r-v; Reg. Vat. 598, c. 2r-6r; Reg. Vat. 659, c. 140v-141r. Cfr. also A.S.C. Cesena, v. 9, c. 15r, 32r-33v.

(16) Cfr. Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 542, c. 139r-140r, Brief of appointment of Raphael de Brognolis de Mantua, 12-VIII-1466.

(17) Cfr. Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 544, c. 128r; Arm. XXIX, Div. Cam. t. 37, c. 204r.

castles in the region of Cesena being at Bertinoro, Santarcangelo, Verucchio, Porto Cesenatico, Valdoppio and Civitella (18).

It is not altogether easy to assess exactly what effect the imposition of this superstructure of Papal officialdom had on the degree of political independence and responsibility enjoyed in practice by the citizens of the Commune within the framework of the communal administration. In Cesena, as elsewhere, the structure of communal government had survived without radical formal alteration throughout the period of Malatesta domination, but the independent authority of communal officials and bodies had been effectively circumscribed by the signorial power in all matters of vital importance (19). It is clear that, in the last analysis, the imposition of the Papal régime merely meant a change of master for the Commune. The structure of communal government was still preserved relatively unaltered. The Commune's statutes and privileges received specific Papal confirmation and the Papal Governor and his officials were bound by oath to observe them (20). At the same time, though, the powers granted to the Papal Governor clearly enabled him to dictate or to over-ride the decisions of communal organs in any matter of importance. Nonetheless, the imposition of the Papal régime was accompanied by the granting of certain Papal concessions to the Commune and by certain modifications in the detail of the Commune's governmental structure. If these concessions and modifications did not really increase the degree of autonomy ultimately enjoyed by the Commune, they may have brought in practice at least some extensions of the Commune's independent responsibility in certain matters and of the opportunities open to citizens to benefit by sharing in the exercise of that responsibility. They may have done something to make the burdens and the restrictions of Papal rule seem somewhat less than those of the rule of the Malatesta *signore*. And when, due to distance or to distraction by other concerns, the machinery of Papal control was weakly operated, these burdens and restrictions may indeed have been less.

The most significant of the Papal concessions to the Commune negotiated by Lorenzo Zane were set forth in a long Papal brief

(18) In 1474, the numbers of soldiers or *paghe* in each of these castles were established as follows: Cesena, 75; Bertinoro, 30; Santarcangelo, 22; Verucchio, 20; Porto Cesenatico, 8; Valdoppio, 6; Civitella, 4 - cfr. Arch. Vat., Arm. XXIX, Div. Cam., t. 37, c. 282r-v.

(19) JONES, *End of Malatesta Rule*, cit., p. 223 ff.

(20) Biblioteca Malatestiana, Cesena, Cod. S.IV.6, f. 202v.

of 21 January 1466 (21). Pride of place was given to financial concessions which seem to embody some extension of the Commune's effective financial autonomy. The exact nature of the financial relations which had subsisted between the Malatesta *signore* and the Commune is difficult to determine. Under Malatesta Novello financial matters were certainly discussed by the communal councils — the apportionment of taxes, control of tax exemptions, and so on — and there are signs that at least the details of fiscal policy were often determined through some sort of genuine negotiation between them and the *Signore* (22). On occasion, they granted subsidies to the *Signore*. On the other hand, it is clear that the Malatesta had effective final control in financial matters and, furthermore, frequently blurred the distinction between their private finances and those of the Commune (23). By the Papal concessions of 1466, however, the Commune was formally granted control of all revenue derived from the city of Cesena, its *contado* and district, with the obligation to pay all salaries, except those of the Papal Governor and Treasurer and their immediate *curia*, at rates laid down in the brief. The Commune was also to meet the current expenses of communal administration, including the costs of repair and maintenance of the city walls and of the port at Porto Cesenatico, for which purposes specified sums were to be reserved each month. The Apostolic Camera demanded the payment by the Commune of an annual *census* or *canon* of 1200 golden cameral florins, and also reserved to itself the proceeds of the salt monopoly, those of the tax on the Jews, and half the proceeds of all convictions, other than those relating to *damni dati* which were to be entirely at the disposal of the Commune. However, in a concession of 16 January, the Pope had already remitted to the Commune for three years the Camera's share of convictions and the tax on the Jews, for the purpose of building the Palace of the *Anziani* (24). And similar concessions were frequently to be made in succeeding years, either for the same purpose or, more often, for the repair and construction of the city's fortifications (25).

(21) Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 525, c. 121v-123r; A.S.C. Cesena, 8, fasc. I (n° VII), and 9, c. 1r-2r. Published in A. THEINER, *Codex diplomaticus domini temporalis S. Sedis*, III, Rome 1862, pp. 443-5, and in R. ZAZZERI, *Storia di Cesena dalla sua origine fino ai tempi di Cesare Borgia*, Cesena 1890, pp. 366-71.

(22) e.g. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 47, c. 3v, 4v, 10v, 13r, 18v-19r.

(23) JONES, *End of Malatesta Rule*, cit., pp. 225-7.

(24) A.S.C. Cesena, v. 9, c. 5v.

(25) e.g. A.S.C. Cesena, 12, XVI, XVII; 13, I, V, VIII, XLII.

Furthermore, the concessions of 21 January laid down that certain taxes were to be suppressed: a tax on wine-making known as the *imbottato*, a tax on bread, and the tax known as the *baratteria*. The Papacy, then, appears to have made every effort possible to avoid its régime being regarded as financially burdensome and to shift financial responsibility on to the shoulders of the communal administration itself.

Another sphere in which the Papal concessions of 1466 appear to have widened the area of the Commune's independent responsibility is that of the election of communal officials. It would seem that under the Malatesta all officials of importance were appointed directly by the *Signore* (26). The concessions of 1466, on the other hand, guaranteed the Commune a part in the election of several important officials. In the case of the *Podestà*, for instance, the Commune was each six months to elect three persons, not citizens of Cesena, of whom one was then to be confirmed in office by the Pope. The Commune was also given a part in the election of the *Vicarius gabellarum* and judge of first appeal: again three foreigners were to be nominated, of whom one was to be confirmed in office, this time by the Governor. All other officials of the Commune and *contado* were to be elected directly by the Commune, subject always to confirmation by the Governor, except for certain specified officials: the office of Constable of the Gates was to be filled from the citizenry by appointment by the Governor, and the castellans of Porto Cesenatico and all other castellanies were to be appointed by the Pope or by an authority specifically commissioned by him. A later brief of 1 March corrected an omission in the brief of 21 January by specifying that the *Officialis Custodie* should be appointed by the Commune from amongst the citizenry, *ad beneplacitum nostrum et successorum nostrorum* (27). It would appear, then, that the powers of the Commune in the election of officials were widened in some respects, although they were still subject to close Papal or gubernatorial control in the case of important offices and still did not extend to the election of most key officials charged with the maintenance of public order and defence.

The Papal concessions of 1466 also gave explicit sanction to the claims of the Commune of Cesena to authority over its *con-*

(26) JONES, *End of Malatesta Rule*, cit., p. 227.

(27) A.S.C. Cesena, 12, fasc. XIV.

tado (28), and re-integrated into the *contado* areas lately alienated or occupied, in particular Montecodruzzo (29), Carpineta and Bulgaria. Provision was also made for the investigation of the conflicting claims of the Commune and Antonio degli Assassini to Montiano (30). Finally, several minor feudatories were named, if willing, as *adherentes et recommendati* of the Commune: Gottofredo Rodolenghi da Iseo of Castronuovo, Gambettola and Boschi; Giovanni Galeotto degli Aguselli of Linaro; Mainardo degli Onesti with Montecastello and Falcino; Giovanfrancesco da Civorio with Civorio; the Tiberti family with Monte Iottone; and the counts of Valdinoce.

Apart from these and several other concessions confirmed by the Papal brief of 21 January 1466, the establishment of the Papal régime brought certain modifications in the structure and responsibilities of the Commune's governing councils. Both the greater council or *Consiglio generale* and the smaller council of the *Anziani* had, with the rest of the structure of communal government, survived throughout the Malatesta period (31). Their part in the government of the Commune never seems to have become merely formal, but their membership and their proceedings were carefully controlled by the *Signore* or his representatives, and their decisions were subject to signorial ratification. It is true that the establishment of the Papal régime does not seem to have resulted in any real extension of the councils' effective powers: Papal or gubernatorial control merely replaced signorial control. However, steps were taken which may have seemed to give greater clarity of definition and therefore greater security to the powers and privileges of the communal councils, and which may have appeared to widen the opportunities for participation in the responsibilities and benefits of council membership and of holding of the offices filled by election by the councils.

The transition to Papal rule brought, firstly, a change in the size of the greater council, the *Consiglio generale*. Its membership had been reduced by the Malatesta from 96 to 72, perhaps

(28) Cfr. PARTNER, op. cit., pp. 185-6.

(29) In 1480, however, when Carlo Malatesta of Sogliano and his heirs were created Counts of Montecodruzzo, the castle and territory were liberated from any other jurisdiction - cfr. Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 600, c. 236v-237v.

(30) Montiano was eventually integrated into the *contado* under Sixtus IV in 1476 - cfr. Arch. Vat., Arm. XXXV, t. 37, c. 140r-141v.

(31) JONES, *End of Malatesta Rule*, cit., pp. 224-5, 228-9.

to make the council more readily controllable (32). By a bull of 27 February 1467, in response to petitions from Cesena, Paul II authorised the increase of the council's membership once more to 96 (33). As we shall see later, there seems to be little reason to suppose that the increase in any significant way transformed the council's social composition, as has been hinted, but the reform may certainly have at least appeared to widen the range of opportunities of access to power and influence in the Commune. On the other hand, it is of course true, as already suggested, that the membership and proceedings of the *Consiglio generale* continued to be as controlled as before. Elections to the council, which were made by the smaller councils, were subject to gubernatorial approval, and on occasion the Governor or the Pope himself might urge the election of particular individuals (34). Deprivation of membership might also result from an initiative of Pope or Governor (35). The proceedings of the *Consiglio generale* seem generally to have been conducted in the presence of the Governor or his lieutenant, and when a proposed piece of legislation had achieved the two-thirds majority necessary for its approval, it was still subject to the ultimate approval of the Governor (36). Moreover, it was understood that Papal instructions and policies were not properly to be voted upon (37), and much of the business of the council involved merely the formal ratification of gubernatorial decrees. Indeed, any proposal for discussion in the *Consiglio generale* had to originate from the members of the smaller councils, who would already have given majority approval to the proposals concerned and obtained gubernatorial approval for their submission to the greater council (38). Nonetheless, despite all these limitations, the surviving volumes of *Riformanze* (39) make it clear

(32) ZAZZERI, op. cit., p. 239; D. BAZZOCCHI-P. GALBUCCI, *Cesena nella Storia*, Bologna 1915, p. 107.

(33) A.S.C. Cesena, 12, fasc. XVI.

(34) e.g. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 56, c. 6v-7r, 9r-v.

(35) e.g. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 50, c. 75v. Normally, membership was for life, unless resignation was permitted for reasons of health or age or absence from Cesena.

(36) Biblioteca Malatestiana, Cesena, Cod. S. IV. 8, f. 8r, cap. 69.

(37) Cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 50, c. 27v.

(38) Cfr. Biblioteca Malatestiana, Cesena, Cod. S. IV. 8, f. 5r, cap. 43, 44; A.S.C. Cesena, v. 48, c. 6v.

(39) The volumes of *Riformanze del Consiglio Generale ed Atti del Magistrato dei Conservatori* in the Archivio Storico Comunale of Cesena surviving from the first two decades of Papal rule are as follows: vv. 48 (3.IX.1467-19.II.1468), 49 (4.XI.1468-29.VI.1469), 50 (1.VII.1469-27.X.1470), 51 (1.VII.1475-31.I.1476), 52 (1.XI.1478-6.XII.1479), 53 (4.V.1480-31.VIII.1481), 54 (3.IX.1481-28.IV.1482), 55.1 (1.V.1482-26.VI.1482), 55.11 (8.V.1482-28.XI.1482), 56 (2.IX.1483-17.I.1485).

that the discussions of the *Consiglio generale* continued to be vigorous and wide-ranging, and that the council played at least a minor rôle in the formulation of public policy on a wide variety of issues, even financial issues, and the widening of access to participation in the council was undoubtedly not a totally insubstantial concession. Furthermore, the council enjoyed the important responsibility of election to communal offices with all their accompanying perquisites.

However, under the Papal régime as under the Malatesta régime, it was the smaller councils rather than the greater council which played the more genuinely active and important rôle in the business of government. But under the Papal régime the predominant rôle was to be played by a new small council, that of the *Conservatori*, apparently inaugurated as the principal governing body of the Commune in March 1466 (40). The old council of the *Anziani* survived as subordinate associate of the *Conservatori*.

The nature and functions of the new council of the *Conservatori* are set out in the *Capitula Consilii Civitatis* approved by the Papal Commissioner, Lorenzo Zane (41). The *Conservatori* were to be six in number. Each group of six was to hold office for two months, a different one of them being elected as president and spokesman each eight days. The *Conservatori* were to be elected by lot, normally in the presence of the Governor, four names being drawn from the *borse* containing the names of the members of the greater council, and two names from the *borse* of the *supernumerarii*, non-members of the greater council who nevertheless had rights of office-holding. It was later laid down that no one individual might serve as a *Conservatore* more than once in twelve months. The *Conservatori* were prohibited from personally carrying out the duties of any other communal office while acting as *Conservatori*, and they were also prohibited from exercising any trade or profession or from engaging in commerce while in office. An apparent attempt to avoid exploitation of the office by family pressure groups was also made by the provision that any one group of *Conservatori* should not include men tied to one another by certain close blood-relationships (42).

(40) Cfr. Biblioteca Civica Gambalunga, Rimini, Cod. già segnato D.I. 29 (see below), c. 4r.

(41) Biblioteca Malatestiana, Cesena, Cod. S.IV.8; also Cod. S.IV.7. Cfr. also Arch. Vat., Arm. XXIX, Div. Cam. t. 34, c. 134r-142v.

(42) The relationships specified were father and son, first cousins, father-in-law

During their term of office, the *Conservatori* were to be regarded as the impersonation of the Commune, and they were accorded considerable honours and privileges. To defame them was a serious offence. They were to be immune from proceedings at law during their period of office, except in cases of alleged homicide, highway robbery, conspiracy against the Church, blasphemy or acceptance of bribes. They were to be paid a salary of 80 golden florins a month. The meetings of the *Conservatori*, which were generally in conjunction with the *Anziani* and the *Regulatores* of the Commune, were considerably more frequent and regular than those of the *Consiglio generale* (43), and the range of their powers and responsibilities correspondingly more extensive. The *Podestà* and all other officials of the Commune were obliged to co-operate with them. They conducted correspondence in the name of the Commune, and they were authorised to commission the ambassadors elected in the *Consiglio generale* — it being prohibited, however, to send ambassadors without the consent of the Governor, except to the Pope. The *Conservatori* had certain powers of law-enforcement, and they could imprison and impose limited fines. They also had limited powers of pardon. They were not, however, to interfere in cases before the courts, except to arrange an agreement between the parties involved. The *Conservatori* were also empowered to expend communal funds up to the sum of three golden ducats in matters of public interest, with the consent of the *Regulatores*, and even without this consent in cases affecting the honour of the Commune. The *Conservatori* also, together with the *Anziani*, convoked the *Consiglio generale* and, with the consent of the Governor, they initiated there discussions of proposals approved by a two-thirds majority of themselves and the *Anziani*. There were, however, obvious limits to the powers of initiative of the *Conservatori*. Their proceedings were closely controlled by the Governor, by virtue of his control over their membership and the necessity of his approval before any of their proposals could be taken further. Consultations between *Conservatori* and Governor seem to have been frequent and close. Furthermore, the powers

and son-in-law, connections by marriage of whom one was married to the blood sister of the other or who were married to two blood sisters, paternal or maternal uncle and blood nephew, step-father and step-son.

(43) Meetings of the *Consiglio generale* appear to have been quite sporadic: in some months it might meet four or five times, in others once or not at all. The *Conservatori* and *Anziani* appear more usually to have met five or six times a month.

of the *Conservatori* were specifically limited in certain matters. They were prohibited, for instance, from confirming people in communal offices beyond their elected term, even with the consent of the *Consiglio generale*. They were also specifically prohibited from declaring war or taking any course of action which might provoke war without the express consent of the *Consiglio generale* and the confirmation of the Governor.

It is difficult precisely to determine the relationship between the six *Conservatori* and the twelve *Anziani*, who continued to be elected regularly under the Papal régime (44). The same men seem to have served at different times on both councils, and the two bodies seem generally to have functioned together, as one council in effect, in association with the four *Regulatores* — the men elected each six months as general custodians of the rights and property and finances of the Commune (45). The *Anziani* seem to have continued to enjoy the honours and privileges conferred on them by the Statutes, although now sharing them with the *Conservatori*. Formally speaking, however, it would appear that the *Anziani* now ranked after the *Conservatori*. The *Capitula consilii* speak of them as having a particular concern with matters such as the regulation of communal celebration of the great feasts, the supervision of markets, the repair of the port of Cesena, the sale of the duty on seed-grain, and the annual reform of the *Consiglio generale* in collaboration with six elected citizens. They speak of them as having the duty of advising the *Conservatori* generally on matters of public import. However, in practice it would appear that their involvement in the inner affairs of the Commune continued to be quite general and intimate. It might therefore be possible to regard the institution of the council of the *Conservatori* as in effect an enlargement of the smaller council of the Commune.

The establishment of Papal rule in Cesena, then, merely meant in one respect the substitution of the overriding control over communal life of one *signore* for that of another. In other respects, however, it may have brought some widening of the privileges and responsibilities of the Commune, and at least an apparent ex-

(44) It was stipulated in the *Capitula consilii* (cap. 68) that they should be elected every two months, but in fact, at least from July 1467, they appear to have been elected every three months - cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 48, and Bibl. Gambalunga, Rimini, Cod. già segnato D.I. 29 (see below).

(45) Cfr. Bibl. Malatestiana, Cesena, Cod. S.IV.8, f. 8r-v, cap. 70-1.

tension of opportunities for taking an effectively influential part in the direction of the Commune's affairs and exploiting that influence for private gain.

III

The scattered and fragmentary nature of the surviving evidence makes it difficult to make a full assessment of the impact of the change of régime on the actual pattern of distribution of political, social and economic power within the Commune. Nonetheless, certain general conclusions seem to emerge from an examination of some of the more readily accessible evidence.

Dr. Philip Jones has drawn attention to the importance as a foundation of the Malatesta régime, at Cesena and elsewhere, of the ties which the Malatesta *signori* formed with an oligarchic political clientele, drawn from the territorial baronage and the noble or bureaucratic families of the urban commune itself. At Cesena, most of the families who emerged to oligarchical dominance under the Malatesta — either as officials of the *Signore* or as councillors or officials of the Commune — seem to have been families first established in Cesena in the period of Malatesta rule (46). Although initially the dominance of these families in many cases was undoubtedly due primarily to Malatesta favour, this dominance does not seem to have remained indissolubly linked with the survival of the Malatesta régime. The establishment of Papal rule in Cesena in 1465 does not seem to have been accompanied by any very significant changes in the composition of this dominant oligarchic group. The ties which had bound these families to the Malatesta seem to have been superseded relatively smoothly by new ties binding them to the new Papal régime. There are no evidences of large-scale expulsions or departures of the oligarchs of the Malatesta period on the establishment of Papal rule: nor does the Papal régime seem to have resorted to large-scale importation into the Commune of new elements to constitute a new oligarchic group. The citizen families and individuals playing the most prominent parts in communal life continue, on the whole, to be the same ones as before.

It has been suggested, in fact, that by 1465 there had already been built up in Cesena a substantial Papal following amongst which most of the Commune's ruling oligarchs must be numbered. The

(46) JONES, *End of Malatesta Rule*, cit., pp. 242-4.

real basis of the Malatesta following by this time, it is suggested, had become the loyalty of the lower social groups in the city itself and, more particularly, the loyalty of the inhabitants of the *contado* (47). There is, however, virtually no direct evidence of the attitude of these latter groups in 1465. There is certainly evidence of later opposition to the régime in Cesena on the part of the *contadini*, and even, in 1469, some evidence of a connection between this opposition and a loyalty to the Malatesta. But, as we shall see later, the connection between commune-*contado* strife and loyalties to one régime or another as such appears at the most to be incidental. The defection of the ruling oligarchs from the Malatesta following, on the other hand, seems to be quite clearly establishable, although only a partly conjectural answer may be given to the problem of what had actually happened to the Malatesta « interest ». Undoubtedly the consequences of the long war with Pius II must loom large in any explanation, both by virtue of the burdens — oppressive taxation, damage to property, the drain of purveyance, and so on — which it imposed on the subjects of the Malatesta dominions, and by virtue of the damage to Malatesta power and prestige which its outcome involved. It is clear that in the closing years of Malatesta Novello's rule the financial foundations of his *signoria* were gravely undermined (48), and his capacity to play a predominant rôle in the financial life of the Commune and to maintain a flow of loyalty-winning favours therefore severely damaged. Furthermore, as Jones has suggested, the terms of the treaty of 1463, giving as they did some formal guarantee of a return to the direct dominion of the Church, may in themselves have given impetus to the formation of a Papal following amongst those anxious for change or at least determined to profit by it when it came (49).

(47) CHIARAMONTI, op. cit., p. 738; G. B. BRASCHI, *Memoriae Caesenates sacrae et profanae*, Romae 1738, p. 318.

(48) Signs of financial crisis may be seen in the financial discussions of the *Anziani* recorded in the one surviving volume of *Riformanze* from the later years of Malatesta Novello's rule (16.XI.1460-9.X.1462) - cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 47, c. 104v, 106v, 145v-146r. Signs may also be seen in Malatesta Novello's frequent sales of lands and castles through the 1460's (see A. DOMENICONI, *La Compagnia dei Molini di Cesena. Origine, sviluppi e vicende dal sec. XIV ad oggi*, Faenza 1956, pp. 7-8) and above all in his sale of Cervia to Venice in 1463 (cfr. SORANZO, *Pio II*, cit., pp. 386-7). Furthermore, at his death, Malatesta Novello was in debt to the Apostolic Camera for *census* unpaid to the extent of 6,000 golden cameral ducats, to say nothing of various penalties to which he had been subjected (cfr. Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 525, c. 47v-48r). The business of satisfying his other creditors was to remain a preoccupation of the Papal régime for many years.

(49) JONES, *End of Malatesta Rule*, cit., p. 244.

Evidence of the continuity of composition of the dominant oligarchic group in the Commune before and after 1465 may be seen, first of all, in the surviving lists of council-members and office-holders of the Commune. As we have seen, the terms on which Papal rule was re-established in certain respects widened opportunities for participation in communal councils and offices, but this does not seem on the whole to have led to the eclipse of the families and individuals of already established prominence.

As already suggested, the addition of 24 new members to the *Consiglio generale* in October 1467 seems to have done little to transform significantly the council's social character, despite the assertions of some chronicle sources about the « plebeian » status of the added members (50). Included amongst the 24 names (51) were several from families already represented, or even prominent, both in the council and amongst the regular office-holders of the Commune — Eburniolo degli Eburnioli, Annibale Lapi and Napoleone Tiberti, for instance (52). It is true that most of the additions seem to be men previously of relatively little consequence in communal affairs, but the surviving records of the council's activities do not suggest that they seriously disturbed the earlier predominance of representatives of families like the Tiberti or the Martinelli, or like the Abbati, the Aguselli, the Borelli, the Bucci, the Eburnioli, the Lapi and others. Furthermore, the pattern of distribution of influence in the council amongst the citizen families was per-

(50) Cfr. Biblioteca Comunale di Cesena, MS.164.64, Giuliano FANTAGUZZI, *Caos*, p. 240; MS.164.70.4, *Cronaca della Città di Cesena*, da scrittore anonimo, raccolta da G. SASSI, p. 28.

(51) A.S.C. Cesena, v. 48, c. 13r.

(52) Eburniolo degli Eburnioli came of a family which had distinguished itself in the service of the service of the Malatesta of Rimini and of Cesena and been rewarded with territorial possessions, primarily in the Marches - possessions restored to them by Paul II's brief of 21 January 1466. His father, Pietro Giovanni, had been a member of the *Cons. gen.* under Malatesta Novello (cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 47, c. 10r, 83v), and Eburniolo himself was brother-in-law to Annibale Lapi. (On the Eburnioli, cfr. ZAZZERI, *op. cit.*, p. 268, 365; DOMENICONI, *Compagnia dei Molini*, *cit.*, p. 27.) Annibale Lapi was son of Taddeo Lapi, who had been a councillor under Malatesta Novello, and whose two brothers Azzo and Gaspar ere still councillors. The noble family of Lapi had probably been established in Cesena from as early as 1300 and had long been prominent in communal affairs (cfr. ZAZZERI, *op. cit.*, p. 210). Gaspar Lapi had been Camerarius to Malatesta Novello (cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 47, c. 8v). The Tiberti family will come up for discussion later. At this stage it appears already to have had four other representatives in the Council. Of the other citizens added to the Council in 1467, two more appear to be connected with families already represented in it. Several others appear to come from families of established prominence in Cesena, and four of them had previously functioned as *Conservatori*.

petuated by the convention that a man's place, on his death, should normally be taken by his son or brother (53).

A reasonably complete picture of trends in the holding of communal office in the first decade of Papal rule may be gained from a register surviving in the Biblioteca Gambalunga in Rimini (54). This register, kept by the Chancellors of the Commune, contains lists of elections of officials of the Commune of Cesena from March 1466, when the new constitution associated with the Papal régime seems first to have been applied, until July 1477. The lists, firstly, of *Conservatori* given in the Gambalunga register include some 200 individual names. Half of these names, however, appear only once in the course of the eleven-year period, and another quarter appear only twice. Some 35 names appear three times, and another 13 appear four times. One name, that of Andrea Masini, appears five times, although he did not serve five times. Amongst the frequent holders of the office of *Conservatore*, certain family groups predominate. Both the Tiberti and Martinelli families, long dominant in communal affairs, are represented in approximately 20 per cent of the teams of *Conservatori* elected in the period. Amongst other family names which occur with notable frequency in the lists are those of the Abbati, the Borelli, the Bucci, the Eburnioli, the Fabrizi, the Gennari, the Iseppi, the Lancetti, the Lapi, the Masini, the Pasini, the Pasolini, the Toschi and the Zanolini — once again mostly names familiar in the government of the Commune before the re-establishment of Papal rule.

A similar impression may be derived from a rather wider survey of recorded lists of elections to communal offices. For instance, taking as a sample a group of the more significant communal offices — *Conservatore*, *Anziano*, *Regulator*, *Chancellor* of the Commune, *Treasurer* of the Commune, *Captain* of the *Contado*, *Official* of the Guard, *Podestà* of the Port and *Consul* of the *Arte della Lana* — one finds that, although approximately 320 individual names appear in the lists in the Gambalunga register, the names which appear with any frequency are much fewer in number. Some 150 names appear only once, and another 35 or so appear only twice. Once again, too, certain family names predominate.

(53) Cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 48, c. 54r; v. 50, c. 3v, 46r-v, 47r-v; v. 56, c. 6v-7r.

(54) MS. già segnato D.I. 29, *Matricula notariorum et officialium Civitatis Cesene eorumque extractiones Eiusque comitatus quo tempore facte fuerunt Imbosolationes*, vol. di cc. 148 num., inscribed: « Donato da Mons. Giacomo Villani a D. Girolamo Avanzolini » (Bibliotecario della Biblioteca Gambalunga, 1649-78).

To some degree this predominance is a function of the number of their members included in the *borse* for these offices: the Tiberti family, for instance, is represented by nine of its members; the Martinelli family by seven of its members; the Pasolini family by six; the Fabrizi, Iseppi and Masini families by four; the Abbati, Borelli, Gualaghini, Lancetti, Lapi and Pasini families by three. Also, those families with notaries in their ranks enjoy a natural prominence, and have open to them in addition a considerable range of specifically notarial offices. But taking into account as well frequency of individual office-holding, it might be reasonable to suggest that, at least from the point of view of tenure of elective offices in the Commune, the Commune of Cesena between 1466 and 1477 was to a large extent dominated by a group of some thirty families, the great majority of which had been represented amongst the councillors and office-holders of the closing years of the previous régime.

This dominant oligarchic group also seems to have become bound to the Papal régime by ties of protection and favour similar to those which had earlier cemented many of them together as a Malatesta clientele. The directions in which Papal political patronage flowed seem, in fact, to be very similar to those taken by the patronage of the Malatesta: on the whole, the same group of families and individuals seem to have been the chief beneficiaries. The evidence of this so far available is fragmentary, and doubtless needs to be supplemented by the fruits of an exhaustive analysis of the rich but disorderly registers of the notarial archives. However, even the fragments of evidence to hand cast some light on the transformation of the Malatesta clientele into a Papal one.

Citizen participation in the actual Papal administration of the Commune and the Province was, of course, necessarily limited. Both the Egidian Constitutions and the specific agreements between Paul II and the Commune of Cesena laid down that the key officials of the gubernatorial *curia* should be « foreigners ». However, the transition to Papal rule may have widened opportunities for obtaining Papal employment in various administrative, judicial, military and perhaps also ecclesiastical capacities outside Cesena, and the winning or the hope of such employment may have constituted a bond between the Papal régime and the appropriately qualified sector of the citizenry. Amongst the ranks of the *podestà* and castellans of the Papal State in the years after 1465, for instance,

one may find names like Francesco Casini (55), Dario Tiberti (56) and Bartolomeo di messer Bonifazio Martinelli (57). Undoubtedly the Papacy controlled access to a much wider range of such preferment than did the Malatesta *signore*.

The Papal régime seems also to have paid particular attention to the cultivation of ties with those elements of the territorial baronage which had been aggregated to the Commune of Cesena and become prominent in its affairs. In some respects, it might be possible to speak of a Papal re-moulding of the network of «feudal» relationships in the area to make it a more effective support for the Papal régime, in much the same fashion as the Malatesta had attempted to re-mould these relationships at an earlier stage. Various important families amongst the territorial baronage were granted confirmation or extension of their territorial rights and possessions, protection against invasion of their rights on the part of the Commune, special economic and fiscal privileges, and military employment in the service of the Church. As we have seen, Paul II's brief of 21 January 1466 named certain minor feudataries as *adherentes et recommendati* of the Commune of Cesena and confirmed them in their possessions. Amongst these were Gottofredo Rodolenghi da Iseo of Castronuovo, Gambettola and Boschi, Giovanni Galeotto degli Aguselli of Linaro, and the Tiberti of Monte Iottone. Gottofredo da Iseo was also employed by Paul II and Sixtus IV as *Bargello* of the Province of Romagna until 1473, with a provision of 30 golden cameral ducats a month (58). Later, in 1477, in recognition of his services to the Church and in particular his association with the City Prefect Giovanni della Rovere in its defence, Gottofredo was granted the proceeds of the tax on the Jews of Cesena for seven years (59). Giovanni Galeotto degli Aguselli was raised to the status of Count by Paul II in February 1466, in reward for his fidelity to the Holy See at the time of Cesena's return to Papal rule (60). In 1472, Sixtus IV granted him, free of charge, enough salt from that made in the

(55) Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 658, c. 44v-45r (Podestà of Bologna, 20.IV.1480).

(56) Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 543, c. 121v-122r (Podestà of Perugia, 3.III.1471).

(57) Cfr. *Le Vite di Paolo II di Gasparo da Verona e di Michele Canensi*, ed. G. ZIPPEL, *R.I.S.*, new ed., III.16, p. 133, n. 3 (Castellan of Saracinesco in February 1470).

(58) Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 544, c. 128r; Archivio di Stato, Roma, Archivio Camerale, Tesoreria di Romagna, Busta 3, Reg. 12, c. 28v.

(59) Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 583, c. 104v-105r; A.S.C. Cesena, v. 9, c. 14r.

(60) Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 542, c. 102r-103v.

salara of Cesena to satisfy the yearly needs of the inhabitants of Linaro (61). Of the Tiberti, Napoleone di Piramo seems regularly to have been employed as a *condottiere* of the Church (62). Dario Tiberti, as mentioned, appears in the lists of *podestà* of the Papal State. In 1483-4, Polidoro di Ascanio Tiberti was admitted to the *Consiglio generale* of Cesena, in contravention of normal procedure, by virtue of a direct Papal intervention which seems to have been directed towards preserving the strength of the Tiberti representation in the council (63). Another member of the territorial baronage who appears regularly in the service of the Church as *condottiere* is Giovan Francesco dei conti Guidi di Bagno, a most influential figure in Cesena in the years of Papal rule up to his death in 1490 (64). And there seem to be evidences of Papal favouring and protection of other representatives of the territorial baronage less prominent in the life of Cesena itself, including the branches of the Malatesta of Sogliano and of Cusercoli (65).

The Papal administration also had at its disposal, of course, certain notable business privileges and opportunities which it could make available to various members of the citizenry. In this respect, the history of three key enterprises in the first decades of Papal rule is suggestive. First of all, the Papal project for the reconstruction of the new castle of Cesena — which, as Antonio Domeniconi has shown, was one of the major preoccupations of the Papal régime in these years (66) — provided profitable opportunities for citizen contractors such as Andrea del fu Gabriele del Sale, maestro Francesco di Cristoforo Baldini da Ferrara and Francesco di Severo Folli, and for Niccolò del fu Ser Ludovico Martinelli as *Depositario* of the fund for the project. Undoubtedly, the project also did much to provide employment opportunities for other lesser men. As Domeniconi has shown, the business of the reconstruction was spread over the period from 1466 until at least 1480.

(61) Arch. Vat., Arm. XXIX, Div. Cam., t. 38, c. 228r.

(62) Cfr. Arch. Vat., Arm. XXXIV, t. 11, c. 29r-v; Arm. XXIX, Div. Cam., t. 37, c. 61v.

(63) A.S.C. Cesena, v. 56, c. 6v-7r, 9r-v.

(64) Arch. Vat., Arm. XXIX, Div. Cam., t. 34, c. 94v-95v, 146v-150r; t. 42, c. 9v-10v; t. 43, c. 119r, 233r-234r.

(65) Cfr. Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 600, c. 236v-237v; Biblioteca Nazionale, Firenze, MS. II, III, 256 (Minutario di brevi di Sisto IV, 25.VIII.1481-24.VIII.1482), c. 184v-185v, 270r-v, 295v.

(66) A. DOMENICONI, *Documenti relativi alla ricostruzione della rocca di Cesena dopo la fine della signoria Malatestiana (1466-1480)*, in « Studi Romagnoli », XI (1960), pp. 287-333.

A second field in which the Papal régime had notable business privileges to confer was that of the provincial salt monopoly, which the Apostolic Camera was enabled for the first time to organise effectively in its own interest after Malatesta Novello's death — although its profitability was greatly damaged by Malatesta Novello's alienation to Venice of the vital salt-manufacturing centre of Cervia. The actual management of the *salaria* of the Romagna — the organisation for the compulsory sale of salt as distinct from the *saline* or manufactories of salt — was not confided to citizens of Cesena (67). However, in July 1466, the Papal Commissioner Lorenzo Zane sought to remedy the loss of Cervia with the construction of new salt-pans at Porto Cesenatico. He confided the task of construction and operation of these *saline* to a prominent merchant of Cesena, Jacopo di Angelo Bucci, thus conferring on the Bucci family what was to be a valuable and lasting privilege (68). On the expiry of the original concession in 1479, the new concession passed, with Jacopo's consent, to his son Giovanni and his heirs for a further period of fifteen years (69).

A third field in which the Apostolic Camera was able to confer lucrative privileges on leading citizens was in the field of the milling monopoly, inherited by the Camera from the Malatesta *signore* (70). Documentation concerning the operation of the mills of Cesena in the early years of the Papal régime is scarce, but it would seem that their management was farmed out to various citizens in return for an annual rent in money or in grain, or in both. The accounts of the provincial treasury in the early 1470's, for instance, contain references to a Massarente da Cesena and later to Francesco di Severo Folli as lessees of the mills (71). In September 1474, Niccolò Martinelli obtained a five-year lease of the three mills of Palazzo, Serravalle and Gualchiera and various appurtenances, for an annual rent of 685 *staio* of grain and 200 *lire di bolognini* or *di quatrini*. He was also granted the privilege of free export of up to 200 *staio* of grain each year during the pe-

(67) For contracts concerning the *salaria* of the Romagna in these years, cfr. Arch. Vat., Arm. XXIX, Div. Cam., t. 34, c. 106r-113v; t. 35, c. 96v-104r; t. 42, c. 14r-19v.

(68) Arch. Vat., Arm. XXIX, Div. Cam., t. 34, c. 114r-120r.

(69) Arch. Vat., Arm. XXIX, Div. Cam., t. 43, c. 216v-224r.

(70) Cfr. DOMENICONI, *La Compagnia dei Molini*, cit.

(71) Arch. di Stato, Roma, Arch. Cam., Tes. di Romagna, Busta 3, Reg. 10, c. 17r, 27v; Reg. 12, c. 25r, 38r.

riod of his lease (72). However, the pressures on cameral finances at this time, above all the costs of the construction of the new castle of Cesena, were causing Papal officials to look for a larger immediate return from the milling monopoly. In April 1475, Sixtus IV sent Lorenzo Zane, now Patriarch of Antioch, to Cesena as Governor for the third time, with the completion of the long-drawn-out reconstruction of the castle as one of his prime responsibilities. And in order to obtain the necessary funds, the Pope authorised him to put up for public auction various possessions of the Apostolic Camera in Cesena and district, including the four mills of Cesena and their appurtenances (73). The identity of the purchasers is interesting. The successful bid of 3500 golden Papal ducats for the purchase of the mills was made by three prominent citizens: Giovan Francesco dei conti Guidi di Bagno, who seems to have remained the principal moving force of the company thus formed until his death in 1490, Francesco del fu Antonio Paolo Casini, and Eburniolo degli Eburnioli. These three, who thus acquired a protected monopoly of milling in Cesena and territory (74), appear to have been acting on behalf of several other prominent citizens, including the then lessee, Niccolò Martinelli, whose five-year export concession was specifically guaranteed. The first available list of the dozen or so partners in the company reads to some extent like a roll-call of the names most prominent in the public life of Cesena, although the name of Tiberti is somewhat conspicuous by its absence (75). This sale of the mills of Cesena by the Apostolic Camera thus seems to have accomplished a significant transference of control over a lucrative sector of the Commune's economic life — the profits of the mills having been one of the most important elements in the signorial budget of the Malatesta — to a representative group of some of the key members of the dominant communal oligarchy.

The impact of the change to Papal rule on the pattern of distribution of political, social and economic power in the Commune would seem, then, to have been relatively slight. Communal office, with all the accompanying perquisites, continued on the whole to be monopolised by the same families and individuals, and there

(72) Arch. Vat., Arm. XXIX, Div. Cam., t. 36, c. 314v-319v.

(73) Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 678, c. 492r-v; A.S.C. Cesena, v. 9, c. 15v.

(74) For the conditions of the sale, see DOMENICONI, *Compagnia dei Molini*, pp. 16-17.

(75) Cfr. *ibid.*, p. 22.

seem also to be signs that the same families and individuals continued to amass the lucrative concessions and privileges which the régime had to bestow. If anything, the accession of the Papal régime may have brought some extension of their economic and — to a lesser extent — political power.

IV

It is clear that, in the decades after 1465, stability was not easily achieved by the newly-established Papal régime in Cesena. Some reflection of the régime's lack of stability may undoubtedly be seen, firstly, in the fact that, in the course of the first two decades alone, there were no less than sixteen changes of Governor (76) — four of them bringing back the first Governor, the redoubtable Lorenzo Zane, who seems perhaps to have been the only man genuinely capable of coping with the difficulties of the office in recurrent times of crisis, and of winning and retaining both the confidence of the Papal Curia and the loyalty and gratitude of the citizenry of Cesena (77). Furthermore, there is ample evidence of a continuing stream of criticism and complaint concerning the maladministration, corruption and tyrannous procedures of the Papal Governors and their officials, and concerning the burdens imposed on the Commune by the Papal régime. And periodically, this undercurrent of discontent would appear to surface in the form of subversive conspiracies or actual armed insurrections.

It is certainly tempting at first sight to give an account of this persistent instability of the Papal régime in terms of — in Antonio Domeniconi's phrase — « la lunga, sorda e spesso aperta resistenza opposta dalla città al suo reinserimento nello Stato pontificio » (78). However, such a characterisation of the troubles of these years would appear hard to reconcile with what we have seen of the terms on which the Papal régime was established and the impact which its establishment appears to have had on the distribution of power within the Commune. It would also, as we shall

(76) Cfr. list in appendix.

(77) For expressions of general communal gratitude towards Lorenzo Zane, cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 51, c. 46v-47r, 51r-52r (Nov. 1475); and v. 52, c. 50v-52v (Nov. 1479, when Lorenzo, together with his brothers Andrea and Alvise and their descendants were given rights of citizenship and admitted to the *Consiglio generale*. They were also permitted to acquire certain lands in the *contado*).

(78) *Documenti*, cit. p. 289 n.

see, both magnify the real extent and impact of the conspiracies and insurrections which occurred — apart from the faction fighting of the 1490's — and oversimplify and misinterpret the stresses and strains undermining the power of the Papal régime to guarantee stable government.

The nature of the stresses and strains building up within the Papal régime in the years after 1465 deserves closer examination. This discussion will concentrate on the first two decades of Papal rule, not because the nature of the stresses and strains in the régime changes later, but rather because, above all in the 1490's, both their scale and their implication in events of more general Italian significance change in a manner such as to demand separate treatment. Evidence of the nature of these stresses and strains is to be found, of course, not only in the conspiracies and insurrections which occurred, but also in the debates of the communal councils and the representations of communal embassies to Rome throughout the period. Above all, however, evidence of their nature is to be found in the complaints laid by the Commune and many of its citizens and inhabitants before the Papal commission of enquiry into the government of the province which visited Cesena and other centres under the authority of its Governor in July 1477 (79). Before the Commissioners, many of the restraints which inevitably muted complaints in the communal councils were not present, and the register of written submissions and minutes of verbal evidence provides the historian with many intimate insights into the workings of the Papal régime, at least in the years from 1471 to 1477. It also enables him to set the complaints made against the Papal administration in Cesena in a wider context, alongside the complaints made against Papal administrators in the other centres of Romagna and the Marches to which the Commissioners' enquiries extended. The pattern of complaint appears to be remarkably constant.

(79) The register of the Commission is to be found in Arch. Vat., Arm. LII, t. 28. The Commissioners for Romagna and the Marches, Giovanni Andrea Grimaldi and Silvestro Malavicini, had been nominated by Sixtus IV on 1 May, together with commissioners for the other provinces of the Papal State, apparently as part of a long-range general programme of reform of the administration of the state and of the workings of the Apostolic Camera. For the original commissions, cfr. Arch. Vat., Arm. XXXI, t. 62, c. 183v-185v. Sixtus IV's bull of 21.VI.1477 to the Commissioners in the Romagna is transcribed in A.S.C. Cesena, v. 9, c. 19r-20r. On the general significance of the Commission, cfr. C. BAUER, *Studi per la storia delle finanze papali durante il pontificato di Sisto IV*, in « Archivio della R. Società Romana di Storia Patria », L (1927), esp. pp. 321-2, although Bauer seems unaware of the appointment of Commissioners other than Grimaldi and Malavicini.

One periodic source of strain between the Commune and the Papal government was the inevitable problem of communication between the Commune and a *Signore* who was now no longer resident on the spot but in distant Rome, preoccupied by a multitude of wider concerns. The Papal Governor in Cesena, for all his extensive powers, was still merely an official under orders, and recourse to Rome was often necessary or desirable. While the remoteness of the Papal *signore* may often have been advantageous to the Commune in allowing it a greater degree of *de facto* independence, the expense and delay of occasional embassies when close contact with the Pope was needed were distinct disadvantages — especially in view of the possibility of the Commune's opponents obtaining a better hearing through more effective representation at the Papal Curia (80). In times of crisis, the Commune seems to have been obliged to exert itself to secure for its case the advocacy of influential Cardinals or foreign ambassadors (81). It was also found necessary to make provision for the appointment of a permanent and salaried procurator or commissioner of the Commune at the Roman Curia (82).

Perhaps the most serious persistent source of friction between the Papal government and its subjects in Cesena, however, was the quality of the administration of the Papal Governors and their officials, in particular their administration of justice. Witnesses before the 1477 Commission complained that the Governors did not respect the competence of the communal courts, but tried as far as possible, in defiance of the communal statutes and the *capitoli* agreed upon by Commune and Papacy, to bring all cases before their own Auditors, *per modo che lofizio delpodesta e del vichario delegabelle operaua pocho* (83). The chief motive for this invasion of the preserve of the communal courts is alleged to be the accumulation of *capisoldi* or *sportule*, the proceeds of which were reportedly often shared between the Governor and his Auditor (84).

(80) Such fears were expressed, for instance, in the course of a case between the Commune and Nascimbene de' Catti da Ferrara in 1468 - A.S.C. Cesena, v. 49, c. 13r.

(81) Cfr. below, concerning the crisis of 1475.

(82) Cfr. discussions leading to the election of Cardinal Bartolomeo Roverella, Archbishop of Ravenna, as procurator at the Roman Curia in December 1468 - A.S.C. Cesena, v. 48, c. 17v, 19v, 23r, 30r-32v. At a later date, Carlo Berardi seems to have performed a similar function - cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 53, c. 61r (1481).

(83) Arch. Vat., Arm. LII, t. 28, c. 8v; cfr. also c. 5r.

(84) In a sample case quoted before the 1477 Commission, 24 golden ducats were allegedly demanded as judges' fees before sentence was given (*ibid.*, c. 8v) and

Governors were also accused of often failing to press charges and settling cases outside the courts, in return for lucrative bribes (85). Governors — in particular the then Governor and Bishop, Giovanni Venturelli da Amelia — were also accused before the 1477 Commission of an extortionate multiplication of chancery fees, of indiscriminate issue of safeconducts and *moratorie* and indiscriminate signing of mutually contradictory supplications, all in return for handsome fees (86). The *Bargello* was also a particular target for accusations before the Commission, above all Matteo da Corvara, who had held that office since 1473 (87). He was accused of illegal imprisonment, of failing to surrender his prisoners to the *Podestà* or of demanding a fee for so doing, of keeping prisoners in his own house rather than sending them to the regular prisons and charging them exorbitantly for the privilege of his hospitality, of compounding with his prisoners for money in *preiudicium camerae apostolicae, et camerae comunis et particularium personarum* (88). He was also accused of being the stimulator rather than the queller and preventer of riots, and was blamed in large part for disturbances which occurred in 1475 and 1477. ... *Fuit et est multorum scelestorum ac delinquentium caput et refugium...* (89). Similar complaints, it must be added, were brought against the Governors and officials of the other centres investigated by the 1477 Commissioners, and were undoubtedly to a large extent the normal accompaniment of government anywhere.

Another serious potential, and classic, source of strain between the Commune and the Papal *signore* lay in the sphere of finance. In earlier periods of direct Papal rule in the Romagna, finance — or, more specifically, Papal taxation — had probably been the most fundamental source of resentment of Papal government (90).

Evangelista da Amelia, Auditor under Giovanni Venturelli, was alleged to have retired from office having made between 600 and 1000 ducats from his extortions (*ibid.*, c. 8v, 30r-v, 32r-v; cfr. also c. 27r, 31r).

(85) An interesting case quoted before the 1477 Commission, and dating from the time of Governor Venturelli, seems to involve the chronicler Giuliano Fantaguzzi, found guilty with some others of stealing. Giuliano's father, Gasparo, *essendo ... di principali richi de questa terra*, allegedly was able to bribe the Governor to issue a *bollettino* characterising Giuliano's crimes as mere puerile indiscretions and ordering the *Podestà* or his vicar not to proceed against him (*ibid.*, c. 9r, 32v, 35v-36r).

(86) *Ibid.*, c. 8r-v, 28v, 29r.

(87) *Ibid.*, c. 5r-v, 14r, 18r, 22r-v, 23r, 27v, 30r, 30v, 31r, 32r, 35v.

(88) *Ibid.*, c. 5r.

(89) *Ibid.*, c. 5r.

(90) Cfr. J. LARNER, *The Lords of Romagna, Romagnol Society and the Origins of the Signorie*, London etc. 1965, pp. 42-3.

It is true that, for most of our period, the finances of both the Commune and the Apostolic Camera appear to have subsisted in a state of endemic crisis (91), and that this was undoubtedly in itself a source of strain. However, the potentialities of fiscal questions as a source of friction between Commune and Papacy after 1465 appear to have been greatly limited by the relative generosity of the Papacy's financial concessions to the Commune in 1466, and by the Papacy's continuation or extension of these concessions — particularly in the form of remission of the proceeds of taxes due to the Apostolic Camera — in succeeding years. Friction did occur, however, in the case of Papal demands for special contributions of money or provisions in time of war, particularly during the wars of the late 1470's and the early 1480's — although protest and resistance never seem to have been carried very far and appear generally to have been coupled with expressions of loyalty to the Pope (92).

Another major and very persistent source of friction between the Commune and the Papal government was the burden imposed on the Commune and its *contado* by virtue of the obligation to provide for the quartering of Papal troops (93). Complaint about this burden was continuous and often vociferous, especially before the 1477 Commissioners. The complaints were directed both against the troops attached to the various castellans and against the troops of Papal *condottieri* like Giovan Francesco Gonzaga of Mantua or Giovan Francesco da Bagno, quartered on Papal demand in the countryside. The complaints, of course, were not merely about the burden of providing quarters and provisions for soldiers and horses in accordance with stipulated conditions. It was alleged that the soldiers did not rest content with their allotted quarters and provisions, but often extorted money payments in their stead

(91) The state of the finances of the Apostolic Camera is reflected in the series of sales of often lucrative cameral possessions which were necessary to provide funds for projects such as the completion of the new castle of Cesena (see above). Complaints at the growing inadequacy of communal revenues to meet expenses and projects for reform of the communal financial administration were recurrent in the debates of the communal councils (cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 48, c. 40r, 41r, 42r-v, 43v-44r, 46v-47r, 60r, 69v-70r, 73r-74v; v. 52, c. 31v, 33r-39r).

(92) Cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 52, c. 10v, 12v, 27r; v. 53, c. 36v, 63r-v; v. 55-I, c. 26r-30r; Arch. Vat., Arm. XL, t. 1, c. 4r; Bibl. Naz., Firenze, MS. II, III, 256, c. 339v-340r.

(93) For samples of such complaints before the 1477 Commission, cfr. Arch. Vat., Arm. LII, t. 28, c. 5r-v, 12r, 7v-8r, 14r, 18r-17v, 27v, 29r-v, 29v-30r, 30v, 32v, 34r, 34v, 35v. For earlier complaints, cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 48, c. 17r-18r; v. 50, c. 62r, 63r; v. 51, c. 8v-10v, 40v, 50v, 55r; for later complaints, v. 53, c. 36r, 38r, 93r.

and then proceeded to steal produce, not merely for their own use, but also to sell — often to the desperate victims of their plundering. They devastated the countryside, ruining crops and pastures and woodland, killing livestock, and terrorising the inhabitants with armed threats. They also invaded the towns, making armed attacks on innocent citizens, killing and raping virtually as they pleased, claiming immunity from the jurisdiction of communal or Papal officials and subjection only to the permissive authority of their direct military commanders. They gravely disrupted commercial life, in particular through their destruction of the peace of the port of Cesena, *ubi mercatoribus quies et refugium esse solet* (94). As Dario Tiberti pointed out to the 1477 Commission, matters were proceeding

... per modo e forma che ad ognhomo pare li siamo dati impredi: et non per subditi de Sancta ghiesia: ma inimici capitalj: cossi simo da loro mal tractati ... (95)

And alarm was also felt at the power which lay within the grasp of the *condottiere* in these conditions. As Azzo Lapi said of Giovan Francesco da Bagno,

... prefatus dominus Johannes franciscus est Inciuitate cesene tanquam tiranidus et posset tradere ciuitatem cui uellet (96).

Friction between Commune and Papacy also appears at times to have been generated by the control of the community's economic life exercised by the Papacy and its representatives. In particular, strife appears to have been caused periodically by Papal restraints on the import and export of grain and by gubernatorial manipulation of the grain market. Papal control over the export of grain was closely exercised (97), and involved, amongst other things, the regulation of the grain market in Cesena in relation to the needs of the province as a whole, or even of the Papal State as a whole. This in itself was the cause of some resentment, as when the Papacy demanded that grain from Cesena supply the needs of Papal forces serving outside the province in time of war,

(94) Arch. Vat., Arm. LII, t. 28, c. 5v.

(95) *Ibid.*, c. 14r.

(96) *Ibid.*, c. 29v.

(97) e.g. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 9, c. 8v-9r (also in 13, fasc. II; and in Arch. Vat., Arm. XXXIX, t. 12, c. 141v).

especially during the War of Ferrara in 1482-3 (98). Several Governors were also accused before the 1477 Commission of having exercised their control over the grain market in a manner ruinous to the community's best interests. For instance, it was said of Andrea Pelli da Fano, Bishop of Recanati and Macerata, who was Governor in 1473, that

... ad petitionem vnus carlenj quem recipiebat pro quolibet bullectino concessit tantam granj quod destruxit dictam ciuitatem cesene ... (99)

Both the succeeding Governor, Bartolomeo della Rovere, Bishop of Ferrara, and his Lieutenant, Francesco de Pernisiis da Savona, Bishop of Famagusta, were accused in similar terms, and also of having compulsorily acquired grain without paying for it (100). Indeed, as we shall see, such grievances seem to have played some part in precipitating the revolt which occurred in 1475.

Again, periodic strain between Commune and Papacy appears to have arisen over the Papacy's occasional lack of respect for the privileges of the Commune in such matters as the election of officials and for the integrity of the communal councils. Despite the fact that the agreements of 1466 stipulated that, in the case of the office of *podestà*, the Pope was merely to confirm in office one of three candidates elected by the Commune, the Commune appears frequently to have been obliged merely to accede to a Papal request for conferment of the office on a Papally-nominated candidate. Although this seems to have occasioned relatively little serious trouble in the communal councils, it did lead to expressions of anxiety that the Commune's privileges should not be invaded (101). More vigorous protest was provoked, however, in 1471 by a Papal nomination to the office of *Officialis custodie* in contravention of the concession granted by Paul II (102). In response to a communal embassy, Sixtus IV felt obliged to guarantee future observance of the concession, although in the following year he provided for a careful gubernatorial revision of the *borsa* for the office (103).

(98) Cfr. Arch. Vat., Arm. XXXIX, t. 15, c. 40r, 133r-v, 133v-134r, 156r-v, 161r-v, 163r-v, 178v-179r, 217v-218r.

(99) Arch. Vat., Arm. LII, t. 28, c. 36r; cfr. also c. 34v, 35r.

(100) Cfr. *ibid.*, c. 19r, 20v-21r, 34v.

(101) Cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 51, c. 48r, 51r; v. 53, c. 28v-30r.

(102) A.S.C. Cesena, v. 9, c. 6r (also Arch. Vat., Arm. XXXIX, t. 14, c. 20v-21r).

(103) Arch. Vat., Arm. XXXIX, t. 14, c. 228r-v.

Again, in 1475, a three-month wrangle developed between Commune and Papacy over a Papal nomination to the office of *Vicarius gabellarum* and judge of first appeal, to which by rights three candidates should have been nominated by the Commune and one confirmed by the Governor. Resistance to accepting the Papal nominee was very strong (104).

Papal or gubernatorial lack of respect for the integrity of the *Consiglio generale* as a forum for free discussion of matters vitally affecting communal well-being, and for the established conventions concerning the creation and deprivation of councillors, also at times became an issue between the citizens and the Papal régime. One particular incident of this type, in fact, figures quite large in the evidence put before the 1477 Commission. Several witnesses, including the victim himself, testified that Ettore Fattiboni — *cuius cesene honeste et probate fame* (105) — had spoken very Frankly in the Council about the shortcomings of the administration of the then Governor and Bishop, Giovanni Venturelli da Amelia — a Governor who, according to Ettore, had said in public council: *Manebo In hac gubernatione Indespectum omnium non uolentium donec uiuet iste pontifex* (106). Fattiboni had spoken of the depredations of the soldiers stationed in the countryside, of neglect of repair of the city walls and the port, of mismanagement of the funds of the Commune. The reply of the Governor was to accuse him of sedition and ban him from further attendance in the Council on pain of 1000 ducats. Ettore's plea that he spoke only in the general interest, and that it was better for him to speak in the Council in the Governor's presence than in the *piazza*, was brushed aside. Before the 1477 Commissioners, Ettore submitted that *non est bonum celebrare consilium ciuitatis Inpalatio Gubernatoris ubi non licet libere loqui pro utilitate ciuitatis*, and other witnesses agreed with him (107).

Another source of strain between the Commune and the Papal régime appears to have been alleged Papal or gubernatorial disturbance of the established relationship between Commune and *contado*. It is true that the Papacy, in its concessions of January 1466, apparently aligned itself with the Commune by a specific confirmation and extension of the Commune's rights in the *contado*.

(104) A.S.C. Cesena, v. 51, c. 6v, 22r, 25v, 27r, 29r-v, 31r, 32r-v.

(105) Arch. Vat., Arm. LII, t. 28, c. 27r.

(106) *Ibid.*, c. 27v.

(107) On this whole incident, cfr. *ibid.*, c. 21v-22r, 27r-v, 27v-28v, 32v.

However, before the 1477 Commission, it was charged that the then Governor Giovanni Venturelli and the *Bargello* Matteo da Corvara were guilty of fomenting discord between citizens and *contadini*, favouring the *contadini* at the expense of the citizens, and in particular encouraging them to seek offices and other urban perquisites against the wishes of the citizenry and contrary to the provisions of the communal statutes (108). This, however, was not an issue which was simply one between Commune and Papacy. It touched on deeper conflicts within local life with a history stretching far back beyond the establishment of the Papal régime and only at most incidentally the product of Papal policies. The *contadini*, for their part, complained of the Commune's non-observance of their *capitoli* made at the time of Cesena's return to the dominion of the Church. They protested against their disproportionate share of the burden of supporting the mercenaries stationed in the *contado*, and against communal manipulation of the *datium damnorum datorum*. Early in 1477, this latter issue occasioned a demonstration of discontented *contadini* in Cesena in the Church of S. Francesco. Contrary to custom, the *datium damnorum datorum* had been sold by the Commune — although a Papal brief of 28 March ordered a return to normal procedures (109). The *contadini* protested that the machinery of the *damni dati* was being used as a means of exploiting them, and in particular that, when *contadini* could not identify those responsible for damage to the property of citizens in their *guardie*, they themselves were being held liable. They also complained before the 1477 Commission of the unjust imprisonment and extortion to which some of their number were subjected as a result of their demonstration in S. Francesco — which they claimed had been solely for the purpose of organising a mission to the Pope, but which the Commune appears to have treated as an incipient riot (110). Here, then, the issues were deeply complicated by long-standing strains which had little essential connection with the question of loyalty to the Papal régime as such.

As already suggested, the extent to which surviving loyalties to the Malatesta disturbed the stability of the Papal régime in Cesena would appear to be slight. Certainly it is possible to find

(108) *Ibid.*, c. 5r-v, 30v, 32r.

(109) Cfr. *ibid.*, c. 5r-v, 18r-17v; also BRASCHI, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

(110) For the complaints of the *contadini* before the 1477 Commission, cfr. Arch. Vat., Arm. LII, t. 28, c. 18r-17v. For earlier strain between *contadini* and *cittadini* over the burden of mercenaries, cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 9, c. 13v.

occasions, in the debates of the communal councils or in submissions before the 1477 Commission, when complaint at a defect in the Papal régime is associated with re-evocation of a corresponding virtue in the régime of Malatesta Novello. However, there appears to have been no widely-felt nostalgia for the past régime amongst the influential groups in the Commune. The plot to consign Cesena to Roberto Malatesta in March 1469 appears to have been largely the work of insignificant *contadini* (111). The report which reached the Duke of Milan, that the insurrection which occurred in Cesena in 1475 was also aimed at consigning the city to Roberto Malatesta (112), appears to have been without substance.

Such, then, appear to have been the principal issues which might have provided the stimulus for a general movement of resistance against the Papal régime as such on the part of the Commune, or more especially on the part of the oligarchical group which largely monopolised power within it. However, although these issues certainly provoked complaint and instability, most of them, in the last analysis, had no essential connection with the community's subjection to a Papal régime rather than to any other form of régime. And in fact, these issues do not appear to have led to the development of a concerted opposition to the régime as such on the part of the communal oligarchy (113). Nor do they appear to have led to the emergence within the oligarchy's ranks of a specifically or consistently anti-Papal faction. The debates of the communal councils, in so far as records of them survive, reflect no clear division between a Papal « party » and an anti-Papal « party ». Alignments vary from issue to issue, and — although this might be expected in view of the councils' relationship to the Governor — few radically anti-Papal sentiments are expressed.

(111) Cfr. CHIARAMONTI, *op. cit.*, pp. 738-9.

(112) Archivio di Stato, Milano, Arch. Sforzesco, Potenze Estere, Romagna, 184, Duke of Milan to Giovanni Bentivoglio, 2.IV.1475.

(113) It should, of course, be noted that the Papal government appears to have displayed considerable sensitivity to the justice of the grievances with which we have been dealing, and which appear to have been widespread throughout the Papal State. There is a continuing stream of Papal legislation, some of general application and some of particular application to Cesena, seeking to correct and control the abuses arousing complaint. Its repetitiveness, however, suggests relative inefficacy. The most notable Papal measure was the bull *Etsi de cunctorum* of 30 May 1478, a direct product of the 1477 Commissions, which attempted a general re-application of the Egidian Constitutions, with necessary amendments and additions, throughout the Papal State. (Cfr. Arch. Vat., Arm. XXXI, t. 62, c. 160v-164r: published in THEINER, *op. cit.*, III, 494-7; also in *Bullarium Romanum. Bullarum diplomatum et privilegiorum sanctorum Romanorum Pontificum*, Taurinensis Editio, Tomus V, Augustae Taurinorum MDCCCLX, pp. 259-263).

As for the actual conspiracies and insurrections which did occur during the first years of Papal rule, their extent and impact seem to have remained strictly limited, and they do not appear to be readily interpretable as proceeding from widespread opposition to the régime as such. The grievances behind these disturbances seem on the whole to have been those of individuals or sectional groups, and they seem to have been only incidentally, if at all, associated with positive attitudes to the form of the régime. The disturbances were quickly repressed and do not appear to have threatened any significant transformation of the relations between Commune and Papacy. For instance, the conspiracy of March 1469 to which reference has been made, from the identity of those executed as a result of its discovery, would seem to have been associated primarily with the sectional grievances of the *contadini* and to have enjoyed no widespread support within the urban commune itself (114). The conspiracy was quickly thwarted and its instigators punished, apparently without occasioning significant disorder in the city, and the *Conservatori* and *Anziani* of the Commune readily acceded to the request of the Governor and Treasurer to send Bonifazio Martinelli as ambassador to Rome to excuse the Commune before the Pope for what had happened, and at the same time to request certain financial concession for construction work, in particular for the repair of the city walls (115). The embassy appears to have been well received in Rome, and financial concessions were granted to the Commune (116). Meanwhile, significantly, the *Conservatori* and *Anziani* had also made provision for the appointment of guardians in the *contado* where they were lacking (117). The disturbance caused by the demonstration of discontented *contadini* in the Church of S. Francesco early in 1477, to which reference has also been made, seems even more certainly to have been connected primarily with the sectional grievances of the *contadini* against the Commune, rather than in any sense against the Papal régime as such. Indeed, there seems to have been little intention to create a disturbance at all, but merely rather to organise a mission to the Pope.

An apparently more significant revolt took place in March 1475, during the governorship of Bartolomeo della Rovere, Bishop

(114) Cfr. CHIARAMONTI, op. cit., pp. 738-9.

(115) A.S.C. Cesena, v. 49, c. 38v-40r.

(116) A.S.C. Cesena, v. 9, c. 7r-v; also 12, fasc. XVII.

(117) A.S.C. Cesena, v. 49, c. 40r.

of Ferrara and nephew of Pope Sixtus IV. But this, too, seems on closer examination to have been less of a genuine threat to the Papal régime than was at first feared. The first alarm brought Pino Ordelaffi hurrying to the Governor's aid from Forlì (118) and provoked the Duke of Milan to order Giovanni Bentivoglio of Bologna and others to stand by to give aid also (119). However, it soon transpired that it was *uno pocho de tumulto senza fondamento* (120), and that *questa cosa non ha alcuno reo fondamento contro La S.^{ta} de n. S.^r* (121). According to the Florentine Captain at Bagno di Romagna (122), the origin of the trouble lay in *certo grano chel legato hauea comperato da Cittadinj et non lha uoluto pagare*. The aggrieved citizens had despatched two ambassadors to carry their complaints to Rome, but — in the absence of the Governor in Ferrara — the Governor's Lieutenant had recalled both them and the Governor. The Governor had immediately sent for the citizens responsible, of whom the principal appears to have been Azzo Lapi. These citizens, according to the account of Pino Ordelaffi,

... temendo non li facesse dispiacere negarno uolerce andare: et comenzarno agridare Chiesa chiesa: et el populo che di sua natura e mobile. statim preso larme ... (123)

Pino Ordelaffi's mediation, however, appears quickly to have quietened the disturbance (124), and the Pope, ascribing the tumult to *leuitati potius quorumdam quam dolo aut malignitati ulli* (125), completed the resolution of the situation by the substitution of his inept nephew as Governor by Lorenzo Zane (126). Further light is cast on the event by the subsequent attempt of the Duke of Urbino to persuade Cesena to readmit Bartolomeo della Rovere as Governor. The attempt was interpreted as designed to prepare the way for a take-over of Cesena on the Pope's death, through the medium of Bartolomeo's brother and the Duke of Urbino's son-

(118) Arch. di Stato, Milano, Arch. Sforzesco, Potenze Estere, Romagna, 184, Pino Ordelaffi to Duke of Milan, 28.III.1475, 29.III.1475.

(119) Loc. cit., Duke of Milan to Giovanni Bentivoglio, 2.IV.1475.

(120) Loc. cit., G. Bentivoglio to Duke of Milan, 6.IV.1475.

(121) Loc. cit., P. Ordelaffi to Duke, 29.III.1475.

(122) Loc. cit., Gaspare della Volta to Lorenzo de' Medici, 30.III.1475.

(123) Loc. cit., P. Ordelaffi to Duke of Milan, 28.III.1475.

(124) Loc. cit., P. Ordelaffi to Duke of Milan, 29.III.1475.

(125) A.S.C. Cesena, 13, fasc. XVII.

(126) Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 678, c. 492r-v; A.S.C. Cesena, v. 9, c. 15r-v.

in-law, Giovanni della Rovere, Papal Vicar of Senigallia and Mondavio. The principal citizens of Cesena, however, proclaimed themselves firmly *desiderosi di rimanere sotto el gouerno: et umbra de la chiesa: et non venire in mane daltri*. They worked through Girolamo Riario, a rival Papal nephew, various Cardinals and the Milanese ambassador in Rome to ensure that Bartolomeo della Rovere should not return as Governor (127), although he appears to have remained for some time provincial Treasurer of the Romagna and Castellan of Cesena (128).

The instability of the Papal régime in Cesena in its first years, then, does not seem to spring from a *lunga, sorda e spesso aperta resistenza opposta dalla città al suo reinserimento nello Stato pontificio*. It seems rather to spring for the most part from what are in effect merely new expressions of long-established tensions in communal life. They may on occasion be expressions in terms of an opposition to Papal rule, but they are not part of any generalised or persistent movement of opposition to Papal rule as such. More often than not, they spring from individual or sectional resentments against the actions of particular officials of the Papal régime. The instability of the Papal régime is in large part the instability which had been inherent in communal life for centuries, an instability stemming from such tensions as those between Commune and *contado* and, above all, those between rival powerful individuals and families scrambling for the spoils which the favour of the régime might confer.

The most insidious threat to the stability of the Papal régime would seem, in fact, to stem from a tension of this latter type: the growing strain between the factions attached to two noble families, the Martinelli and the Tiberti, who, as we have already seen, enjoyed a clear predominance in the affairs of the Commune. Indeed, this feud was to be the rock on which the Papal régime was to founder. The Tiberti had reputedly come to Cesena from Germany in 1184, and had become feudatories of the castle of Monte Iottone (129), a possession in which they were confirmed as *adherentes et recommendati* of the Commune of Cesena by

(127) Arch. di Stato, Milano, Pot. Est., Romagna, 184, Carlo Visconti to Duke of Milan, Bologna, 6.VIII.1475; A.S.C. Cesena, v. 51, c. 5r-6r, 11v.

(128) He appears still to have been Treasurer in August 1477 (cfr. Arch. di Stato, Roma, Arch. Camerale, Tes. di Romagna, Busta 4, Reg. 18). He remained Castellan until August 1479 (cfr. DOMENICONI, *Documenti*, cit., p. 318).

(129) Cfr. ZAZZERI, op. cit., p. 138 n., 221 n.

Paul II in January 1466. The Martinelli were more recently-established in Cesena, having come from Fossombrone in the time of Galeotto Malatesta, to whom the founder of their fortunes in Cesena, Guido Martinelli, was attached as Vicar (130). The origins of the feud between the two families are lost in the vagaries of chronicle accounts (131), but it seems probable that it considerably ante-dated the establishment of the Papal régime. Several accounts date it from a transference of favour by Malatesta Novello from Agamemnone Tiberti to Bonifazio Martinelli in about 1450. Both families survived the transition to Papal rule and appear to have secured a major share in communal power under the new régime. Their feud also appears to have survived the transition to Papal rule and to have provided a constant menace to the régime's stability. There seems, however, to be little reason to associate the feud between the Martinelli and the Tiberti with division on a question of principle concerning the desirability or otherwise of direct Papal rule. Chronicle accounts analyse the feud in terms of the labels « Guelph » and « Ghibelline », but their meaninglessness is effectively illustrated by a lack of agreement about which label was appropriate to which faction. During the first two decades of Papal rule, the political behaviour of representatives of the two families in the communal councils seems virtually indistinguishable. The issue between the two factions seems clearly to have been merely rivalry in the exploitation of the existing régime for the consolidation and extension of their own local predominance — the eternal issue in the faction fights of the communes. No very serious actual threat to the Papal régime from the Martinelli-Tiberti feud appears to have materialised in the first two decades of its existence — although several chronicle accounts connect an incident between the two families with the imprisonment of the Governor Lorenzo Zane on Papal orders in March 1480 (132) —

(130) Cfr. CHIARAMONTI, *op. cit.*, p. 741.

(131) Cfr. Bibl. Com. Cesena, MS.164.66, Niccolò MASINI, *Vita di Domenico Malatesta*, pp. 150-1; also MS.164.70.4, *Cronaca della Città di Cesena*, *cit.*, p. 27; MS.164.46, Ettore BUCCI, *Memorie Antiche della Città di Cesena*, p. 243. Cfr. also CHIARAMONTI, *op. cit.*, pp. 741-2; ZAZZERI, *op. cit.*, pp. 376-8.

(132) The story appears to be that Lorenzo Zane caused the death of a Martinelli at the suggestion of the Tiberti and that then Gasparo Martinelli had the Pope imprison Zane, although accounts vary in their details - cfr. Bibl. Com. Cesena, MS.164.46, *cit.*, p. 9; MS.164.70.4, *cit.*, p. 30, 113. However, other more reliable evidence strongly suggests that the incident is to be connected rather with Papal policy towards Venice at that time, Zane apparently having entered into a plot for the subversion of Cervia — possibly to put pressure on the Venetian government

but the slow fire of the feud seems to have continued to burn, to be fanned into violent flame in the endemic armed faction fighting of the 1490's, which culminated in the notorious *vespero Ceciliano cesenatico* (133) of July 1495 and, eventually, in the displacement of the Papal régime by the new signorial régime of Cesare Borgia. But the complications of these events demand separate and extensive treatment.

V

The displacement of the Malatesta *signoria* in Cesena by the direct *signoria* of the Papacy constitutes, then, an interesting case-study in relations between commune and *signoria*. The change of régime can be seen to have involved no radical change in the structure and processes of communal government, and no radical change in the pattern of distribution of political, social and economic power within the Commune. The life of the Commune seems to have preserved remarkable continuity, regardless of the change of régime. Furthermore, — leaving aside possibilities of external armed intervention, from which Cesena's relative unimportance would seem to have guaranteed her a certain immunity — the stability and durability of the new régime appear to have depended to a large degree on a balancing of forces long-present in communal life, forces not directly created by the imposition of the régime, even if the form of their conflict was to some extent transposed by it. In the last analysis, the fate of the régime would seem to have depended on its capacity to induce an enduring balance between the conflicting political interests inherent in communal life. By 1465, the Malatesta *signoria* had lost this capacity, and by the 1490's, it would appear that the Papal régime, too, had become incapable of justifying the loyalty of its communal subjects and masters.

to admit him to his bishopric of Brescia, from which he had been barred — at the very moment when the Papacy was negotiating an alliance with Venice. Cfr. Arch. di Stato, Milano, Pot. Est., Romagna, 189, Francesco da Casate to Dukes of Milan, Bologna, 4.III.1480, 17.III.1480, 30.III.1480. Furthermore, the barring of Lorenzo Zane from the bishopric of Brescia, in 1478 had proceeded from his condemnation, together with his brothers Alvise and Andrea, for espionage against Venice in the Papal interest. Cfr. *Storia di Brescia*, promossa e diretta da Giovanni TRECCANI DEGLI ALFIERI, II, Brescia 1963, p. 176.

(133) FANTAGUZZI, *Caos*, cit., p. 275.

APPENDIX

GOVERNORS OF CESENA IN THE FIRST TWO DECADES
OF PAPAL RULE

1465 - 1467 Dec.	LORENZO ZANE (134) Archbishop of Spalato and Papal Treasurer-General Papal Commissioner-General in the Romagna
1467	JACOPO FEO DA SAVONA (135) Bishop of Ventimiglia
1467 - 1468 17 Apr.	ANGELO MACCAFANI DA PIRETO (136) Bishop of Marsica
1468 - 1470 5 Sept. May	NICCOLÒ GHIVIZZANI DA GHIVIZZANO (137) Prothonotarius apostolicus
1470	LORENZO ZANE (138)
1470 - 1473 27 Oct. 28 Feb.	DOMENICO CAMISATI (139) Bishop of Marsi
1473 from 1 Mar.	ANDREA PELLI DA FANO (140) Bishop of Recanati and Macerata
1473 - 1475 13 Nov. April	BARTOLOMEO DELLA ROVERE (141) Bishop of Massa Marittima, and later, from 11 July 1474, Bishop of Ferrara

(134) Appointed by bull of 1.XII.1465, cfr. Arch. Vat., Arm. XXIX, Div. Cam., t. 34, c. 114r. According to Reg. Vat. 542, c. 157, he was made Governor-General of the Marches and Fano on 22.II.1467.

(135) Cfr. references to him as Governor in February 1467 in A.S.C. Cesena, v. 9, c. 6v; 12, fasc. XV, XVI. C. EUBEL, *Hierarchia Catholica Medii Aevi*, II, Monasterii MDCCCXIV, p. 268, gives his year of death as 1467.

(136) Bull of appointment of 17.IV.1467 in Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 542, c. 172v-173v.

(137) Bull of appointment of 5.IX.1468 in Reg. Vat. 542, c. 233r-234v. He died early in May 1470, cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 50, c. 63v; Arch. Vat., Arm. XXXIX, t. 10, c. 78 (Giacomo Minutoli to Card. Ammanati, Cesena, 5.V.1470 - also in *Epistolae Card. Papiensis*, Milan 1506 edn., f. 194r-v; Frankfurt 1614 edn., pp. 713-4).

(138) References occur from June 1470 (cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 25, c. 86r), and continue until November 1470 (cfr. Reg. Vat. 538, c. 261v). He appears to have combined the office with the governorship of the Marches (cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 25, c. 86r).

(139) Bull of appointment of 27.X.1470 in Reg. Vat. 543, c. 63r-65r. He was paid up to the end of February 1473 (cfr. Arch. di Stato, Roma, Arch. Camerale, Tes. di Romagna, Busta 3, Reg. 10, c. 23r).

(140) He was paid as Governor from 1.III.1473 (cfr. Arch. di Stato, Roma, Arch. Cam., Tes. di Romagna, Busta 3, Reg. 10, c. 23r). According to G. MERCATI, *Per la cronologia della vita e degli scritti di Niccolò Perotti*, Roma 1925, p. 70, n. 3, he was named Governor of Spoleto in September 1473.

(141) Bull of appointment of 13.XI.1473 in Reg. Vat. 656, c. 18r-19v.

1475 from April	LORENZO ZANE (142) Now Patriarch of Antioch and Bishop of Treviso
1475 - 1479 (?) 2 Nov.	GIOVANNI VENTURELLI DA AMELIA (143) Bishop of Cesena
1478 - ? June	SILVESTRO DA LABRO (?) (144) Abbot of San Pastore, near Rieti (Bishop of Camerino, Sept. 1479)
1479 - 1480 26 Apr. Mar.	LORENZO ZANE <i>stet</i> (145)
1480 14 Mar. -	DOMENICO CAMISATI <i>stet</i> (146) Bishop of Rieti
1480 - 1483 18 Nov.	ANGELUS LUPUS DE CAVIS <i>stet</i> (147) Bishop of Tivoli
1483 3 Oct. - Dec.	FRANCESCO MARIA SCELLONI-VISCONTI <i>stet</i> (148) Bishop of Viterbo and Tuscania
1483 - 1484 25 Dec.	LORENZO ZANE <i>stet</i> (149)
1484 - 1486 7 Sept.	GIOVANNI ROSA <i>stet</i> (150) Bishop-elect of Foligno

(142) Bull of appointment of 9.IV.1475 in Reg. Vat. 678, c. 492r-v. On 7.XII.1475 he was made Governor of Rome - cfr. Reg. Vat. 656, c. 222.

(143) Bull of appointment of 2.XI.1475 in Reg. Vat. 656, c. 201v-204r. Lorenzo Zane was sent again to Cesena as a Commissioner in October 1477 (cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, v. 9, c. 23r-v).

(144) According to Arch. di Stato, Roma, Arch. Camerale, Parte I, Reg. 1715, c. 7v-8r, Silvestro took the oath as Governor of Cesena *et aliarum Civitatum etc.* On 16.VI.1478, although the author has so far found no other records of his governorship. From A.S. Roma, Arch. Cam., Tes. di Romagna, Busta 4, Reg. 20, Giov. Venturelli would seem to have been paid as Governor up to 30.IV.1479.

(145) Bull of appointment of 26.IV.1478 in Reg. Vat. 588, c. 2r-6r. Imprisoned on Papal orders in March 1480, Giovanni Venturelli, Bishop and Castellan, being nominated acting Governor pending a new appointment (cfr. A.S.C. Cesena, 13, fasc. XXXI).

(146) Bull of appointment of 14.III.1480 in A.S.C. Cesena, v. 9, c. 35r-38r. He probably died in about November 1480 (cfr. BRASCHI, *op. cit.*, p. 341 - he was certainly dead by 24.II.1481, cfr. Arch. Vat., Arm. XXIX, Div. Cam., t. 42, c. 218v-223r).

(147) Bull of appointment of 18.XI.1480 in Reg. Vat. 658, c. 88r-92r.

(148) Bull of appointment of 3.X.1483 in Reg. Vat. 659, c. 108v-113r. Soon called to household of Cardinal Giovanni Giacomo Sciafenati - cfr. Papal brief of 27.XII.1483 in Arch. Vat., Arm. XXXIX, t. 16, c. 104r.

(149) Bull of appointment of 25.XII.1483 in Reg. Vat. 659, c. 140v-141r. Shortly after being replaced in September 1484, Lorenzo Zane died in Rome on 2 October 1484 (cfr. JOHANNIS BURCKARDI, *Liber Notarum ab anno MCCCCLXXXIII usque ad annum MDVI*, a cura di E. CELANI, in *R.I.S.*, nuova ed. XXXII.1, Vol. I, p. 85).

(150) Brief of appointment by Innocent VIII, 7.IX.1484, in A.S.C. Cesena, v. 9, c. 47r.